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Imitation
Communicative intentions
Mentalizing system
Mirror neuron systemSuccessful social interaction requires recognising the intention of another person's communicative gestures.
At a neural level, this process may involve neural activity in different systems, such as the mentalizing system
(MS) and the mirror neuron system (MNS). The aim of the present study was to explore the neural correlates
of communicative gestures during observation and execution of these gestures. Twenty participants watched
video clips of an actor executing social gestures (S), non-social gestures (NS) and meaningless gestures (ML).
During fMRI data acquisition, participants were asked to observe (O) and subsequently to execute (E) one of
two tasks: imitate the gesture presented (IMI) or perform amotor control task (CT). For the contrast IMI > CT
we found activations in the core areas of the MNS [inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and inferior frontal cortex, the
posterior part of pars opercularis], as well as in areas related to the MS [superior temporal sulcus (STS) and
middle cingulate cortex]. For S > NS, we found activations in the left medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC),
right superior frontal cortex and middle cingulate cortex. The interaction of stimulus condition (S vs NS)
and task (IMI vs CT) revealed activation in the right IPL. For the interaction between observation vs execution
(O vs E), task (IMI vs CT) and stimulus condition (S vs NS) we found activation in the right mOFC. Our data
suggest that imitation is differentially processed in the MNS as well as in the MS. The activation in IPL is en-
hanced during the processing of social gestures most likely due to their communicative intention. The activa-
tion of IPL together with medial frontal areas may contribute to mentalizing processes. The interaction in the
mOFC suggests an involvement of self-referential processes in the processing of social gesture.
© 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Introduction
Humans use communication as a social tool to affect and modify
others' mental states. Through verbal and gestural modalities humans
construct the meaning of their communication directed to another
person. There is a vast amount of literature on the communicative
processes of speech. However the gestural communicative modality
without accompanied speech, such as facial expressions, eye gaze,
gestures, and body position has received much less attention. Thus
the aim of the present study is to investigate the neural correlates
of communicative gestures during observation and actual imitation.
According to the pragmatic view of communication (Bara, 2011;
Searle, 1981), human communicative competence is based on the abilitychotherapy and Psychosomatics,
. 30, 52074 Aachen, Germany.
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).
rights reserved.to recognise and to process a speciﬁc kind of mental state, namely, com-
municative intention. Communicative intention is deﬁned as two inten-
tions that occur simultaneously: (1) the communicator's intention to
conveymeaning to someone else, and (2) the communicator's intention
that the receiver recognises that he/she has a communicative intention
(Enrici et al., 2011; Frith, 2007; Walter et al., 2004). Recognition of
communicative intent is a complex process in which the receiver has
to recognise the communicator's intentions: (1) the communicator's
conveyed meaning presented in actions (words and gestures), and
(2) the communicator's state ofmind about the effects of his/her actions
over the receiver's mental state. Thus the recognition of communicative
intent involves a second order representation of mental states in which
the receiver has to infer (represent): (1) themeaningof communicator's
actions (words and gestures); and (2) the communicator's representa-
tion of his/her own (receiver's) mental state.
We infer mental states via mentalizing, the psychological ability to
understand and predict other people's behaviours by attributing
mental states to them (Astington et al., 1988; Baron-Cohen, 1995;
Premack and Woodruff, 1978). In the ﬁeld of developmental psychol-
ogy, mentalizing is deﬁned as the ability to psychologically simulate
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into others' shoes” (Carruthers and Smith, 1996; Happe, 2003).
Thus, psychological simulation would involve two processes, proba-
bly acting in concert: (1) imagining (simulating) an intention, desire
or belief in particular; and (2) imagining (simulating) actions re-
sulting from this mental state. The product of these two processes
can be attributed to oneself and others in order to predict or explain
one's own or someone else's actions (Harris, 1991). Whether the
computation of these two simulation processes occur in sequence or
in parallel is not clear in the literature. However, mentalizing abilities
are theoretically assumed necessary to encode the abstract intentions
of others, that is, mental states like beliefs, feelings and desires (Frith,
2007; Wimmer and Perner, 1983).
Based on functional imaging studies, a neural system formentalizing
abilities, the Mentalizing system (MS), has been proposed to comprise
the temporoparietal junction (TPJ, including the posterior part of the su-
perior temporal sulcus [pSTS]) and medial frontal cortex (Abu-Akel,
2003; Bradshaw and Sheppard, 2000; Calder et al., 2002; Ciaramidaro
et al., 2007; David et al., 2006b; den Ouden et al., 2005; Fletcher et al.,
1995; Krach et al., 2008; Newen and Vogeley, 2003; Tavares et al.,
2008). However, only a few fMRI studies explored the neural correlates
of theMS in relation to communicative gestures with content related to
abstract mental states (hand action with symbolic connotation, for ex-
ample, waving goodbye) (Gallagher and Frith, 2004; Liew et al., 2011;
Marsh and Hamilton, 2011; Straube et al., 2010).
Behaviourally, gestures are nothingmore than intended actions that
could be learned byobservation and imitation. The ability to understand
another person's action and imitate that action is a core component of
human social behaviour and learning (Meltzoff and Decety, 2003). A
distinct set of neural regions underlie the imitative process—the Mirror
Neuron system (MNS) (Buccino et al., 2001; Gallese et al., 1996; Pineda,
2008; Rizzolatti et al., 1996), which is activatedwhen an individual per-
forms an intentional action (goal-directed action) and when s/he ob-
serves another person's intentional action (Binkofski and Buccino,
2004; Buccino et al., 2007; Decety and Grezes, 1999; Iacoboni, 2009;
Meltzoff and Decety, 2003; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). The MNS
comprises the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and the posterior part of in-
ferior frontal gyrus (IFG, the posterior part of par opercularis). In the
context of gesture observation and imitation, the MNS possibly has
the function of extracting the motor intentions from the gesture, or ac-
tion concatenation of motor meaning (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2007).
However, further processes would be necessary to extract communica-
tive intentions, or the abstract mental states underlying the observed
gestures. Therefore MS might be also activated during observation and
imitation of communicative gestures that also have embedded abstract
mental states, like beliefs and feelings (Carrington and Bailey, 2009;
Liew et al., 2011; Schippers et al., 2010).
In summary theMS andMNSwouldwork in concert in order to take
an observed communicative gesture as communicative intended. In an
imaging study this hypothesis has been explored further, Schippers et
al. (2009) investigated the neural basis of gestural communication dur-
ing a social game (charade) where pairs of participants had to either
produce meaningful gestures or interpret meaningful gestures of the
other. They found that during passive observation or interpretation
the MNS and TPJ (bilateral) were activated, while during the gesture
production the MNS was activated and the mPFC was deactivated.
These results suggest that the MS and MNS work separately but in par-
allel in extracting the communicative intention (MS) and the motoric
meaning (MNS) of gestures. All gestures performed by the participants
in Schippers et al. (2009) study were considered communicative due to
the nature of the task (charades). However, the content of the gestures
(meaning) were not related to abstract mental states but to a descrip-
tion of procedural actions (i.e. ride a bike or peel a fruit). It might be
that the deactivation of the mPFC during gesturing was because the
conveyed meaning of the gestures performed were not related to ab-
stract mental states.Self-referential processes might also take part in the imitation pro-
cess of communicative gesture, as the content of the gesture imitated
mirror or resonate with self experiences and memories of the observer
and not just goals in the external world (Schippers et al., 2010). In a
meta-analyses study comprising 107 neuroimaging studies of self-
and other-related judgments the mPFC activation was associated with
both self- and other judgments (Denny et al., 2012). Speciﬁcally the
ventral aspect of mPFC (BA24, BA32 and BA10) responds preferentially
for both self-referential processing and mental state inferences about
others (Schippers et al., 2010; Tamir and Mitchell, 2010). Thus during
imitative processes it would be possible to simulate similar abstract
inner states by adopting the perspective of the other during acting
(imaginatively or actual acting).
In sumwhat it is not known to date is the neural correlates of obser-
vation and imitation of communicative gestures with content related to
abstract mental states: what are the different contributions of the MS
and MNS for the understanding of communicative gestures with con-
tent that mirror self and other abstract mental states? We hypothesise
that the MS (mFC and pSTS) and MNS (IFG and IPL) act in parallel
(but complementarily) during observation and execution of communi-
cative gestures in a social context (imitative behaviour) andwith social-
ly relevant content (content related to abstract mental states). Thus we
designed an experiment manipulating: (a) task (imitation [IMI] vs
motor control task [CT]); (b) stimulus content (social [S], non-social
[NS], meaningless [ML]) and (c) experimental phase (observation [O]
vs execution [E]).
The novelty of the present study in the context ofMS andMNS lays in
the imitation of communicative gestures that mirror the self and other
abstract mental states. During face-to-face interaction they elicit similar
abstract mental states in the sender and receiver ‘as if’ the receiver mir-
rors the inner state of the sender simultaneously. The focus of this paper
is not in investigating the speciﬁcities of MNS or MS. Rather we want to
investigate the possible contexts in which parts of both systems are ac-
tivated. In particular, we predicted: (1) activation in neural areas related
to theMNS (such as theposterior inferior frontal gyrus [pars opercularis]
and IPL [area PFt]) for the imitation task contrasted to the control task
during both observation and execution phases; (2) activation in areas
related to the MS (such as cingulate, paracingulate cortex and STS/TPJ)
for social vs non-social gestures (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Mitchell,
2009), (3) activation in areas related to the MNS and MS speciﬁcally
for social gestures modulated by imitation task (IPL, IFG and pSTS);
(4) activation in the medial frontal cortex for social gestures modulated
by the imitation task due to self-referential processing (David et al.,
2006a; de Greck et al., 2008; Northoff et al., 2006; Spengler et al., 2009).
Material and methods
Participants
Twenty-seven right-handed, healthy male participants, with an av-
erage age of 24.6 years (SD = 3.23) were recruited from the staff of
the RWTH University Hospital and were paid for their participation.
Participants reported no past or present medical, psychiatric or neuro-
logical disorders and were not taking any psycho-pharmacological
medication at the time of the study or within the past year. All partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, were native
German speakers and provided informed consent. The study was ap-
proved by the local ethics committee. Only data from 20 participants
are reported; seven participants were excluded due to excessive head
movement (see data analyses) during the fMRI session.
Stimuli
The video clips were chosen from a pool of clips developed by our
group (Green et al., 2009; Kircher et al., 2009b; Straube et al., 2009,
2010, 2011a, 2011b). In each video, the same male actor performed
Fig. 1. Examples of each gesture category.
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ous way, and with no speech. That is, the actor scripted his own ges-
tures as to obtain maximal naturalness. Each stimulus video clip was
originally 5 s in duration, including 500 ms before and after the scene
during which the actor did not move and with his hands at his sides.
For the purpose of this study, the videos were all edited to 4 s with at
least 100 ms before and after each scene to account for the variable
lengths of the gestures and to standardise the videos. Importantly,
the execution of the gestures was actor-driven so as to obtain maxi-
mal naturalness (for a more detailed description of the stimulus ma-
terial production and evaluation see Kircher et al., 2009; Straube et
al., 2009; Green et al., 2009).
The speechless video clips depicted the same male actor with his
face covered; wearing a pullover with a dark or light circle, executing
a gesture with one or both hands and arms (Fig. 1). The colour of the
circle was included after recording the videos, so the two versions are
identical except the circle colour. For a more detailed description of
the stimulus material production and evaluation, see Kircher et al.
(2009), Straube et al. (2009), and Green et al. (2009).
For stimulus selection, 196 video clips were presented to 20 par-
ticipants in a pilot study. These 20 subjects were different from
those who participated in the fMRI study. The participants had to
observe the gestures and immediately afterward rate it, on a scale
of 1 to 7, according to comprehensibility (of the action content),
communicative intention (action with communicative intention re-
lated to self and actor's mental states) and emotionality. We deﬁne
communicative intention as actions that promote in the sender and
receiver a recognition of two conditions at the same time: (a) the
signals are sent (by the sender) with the intention of altering the
receiver's mental state; and (b) the receiver attributes mental states
to the sender (Frith, 2007; Walter et al., 2004). The participants had
to indicate if the gesture observed mirrors their own inner state dur-
ing observation, since not all communicative gestures elicit similar
inner states in receiver and sender, for example, pointing to indicate
a route (Table 1, Non-Social Gesture). Participants also had to de-
scribe in short sentences what they understood as the meaning of
each gesture.
The stimulus material was selected with regards to the stimulus
characteristics of interest (social [S]: meaningful and high communi-
cative intention; non-social [NS]: meaningful and low communicative
intention; Meaningless [ML]: meaningless and low communicative
intention).
For the imaging study we selected 20 items per each condition
(S, NS and ML).1 Mean and standard deviation (SD) values were1 In the present study, meaningless gestures were used as catch trails in which the
participants observed and executed meaningless human manual actions without
meaning. This procedure was used to control for transition probability with respect
to meaningful vs meaningless actions.used in order to select the video clips and create the conditions for the
fMRI study (Table 1). The general criteria for the best rated videos used
in the fMRI study were gestures with the clearest meanings as indicated
by very similar interpretations among the participants' written descrip-
tions and with low variability across participants for all ratings based on
mean and standard deviation (SD) of ratings (SD ≤ 1.5 for comprehen-
sibility, communicative intention and emotionality; Table 1). As the im-
aging study included an imitation task, only video clips of gestures
without head and/or shoulder movements were included in order to
prevent movement artefacts during the scanner sessions. In all three
conditions the same number of gestures was performed with one or
both arms and hands. There was no difference in the average distance
of all gestures from the circle on the actor's pullover.
For the social condition (S), gestureswhich elicited in the participant
a state of communicative intention and mirror in his/herself similar
mental state addressed to the actor (‘wave a greeting’, ‘well done’,
‘look up’), were included. For this category, videos with high ratings
(Mean ≥ 4.5) for comprehensibility, communicative intention and
emotionality were chosen. The non-social condition (NS) included
gestures/mimes which depicted common actions in the physical world
(‘take a note’, ‘cut something with scissors’, ‘turn around’). For this cat-
egory, videos with high ratings for comprehensibility (Mean ≥ 4.5) and
low ratings for communicative intention (Mean ≤ 3.6) and emotionality
(Mean ≤ 3.1) were chosen. For themeaningless condition (ML), random
gestureswith low ratings for comprehensibility, communicative intention
and emotionality (Mean ≤ 3.1) were chosen.
The ﬁnal set of videos used for the fMRI study comprised 20 videos for
each of the 3 conditions were selected (social [S]: meaningful and high
communicative intention; non-social [NS]: meaningful and low commu-
nicative intention; Meaningless [ML]: meaningless and low communica-
tive intention). In this ﬁnal set, communicative intention was rated
signiﬁcantly higher for social than for non-social videos (t(19) = 13.83;
P b .0005) as well as higher for social than for meaningless stimuli
(t(19) = 14.78; P b .0005). Similarly, comprehensibility was rated
signiﬁcantly higher for social than for meaningless stimuli (t(19) =
29.15; P b .0005) and for non-social compared to meaningless stimuli
(t(19) = 24.09; P b .0005). Finally, emotionality was rated signiﬁcant-
ly higher for social than for non-social (t(19) = 10.59; P b .0005) and
for social than for meaningless stimuli (t(19) = 10.59; P b .0005). The
average duration of the gestures (measured from arm movement onset
to arm movement offset) did not differ in the stimulus conditions [S vs
NS (t(19) = −1.12; P b .275); S vs ML (t(14) = −1.74; P b .097); NS
vs ML (t(16) = − .37; P b .714)].
Task
The fMRI experiment was divided into four sessions. All sessions
had the same structure and length, and basically reﬂected a 3 (S, NS,
Table 1
Ratings for gesture categories used in the fMRI study.
Comprehensibility Communicative intention Emotionality
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Social 6.63 .59 5.31 1.24 5.71 1.13
Non-social 5.70 .63 2.74 .48 2.94 .33
Meaningless 2.88 .48 2.34 .64 2.58 .49
297A.G. Mainieri et al. / NeuroImage 81 (2013) 294–305ML) × 2 (IMI, CT) × 2 (O, E; see Fig. 2) repeated measures within sub-
jects. The design used was event-related, the events were modelled as
stick functions (duration = 0 s) using the canonical HRF function.
During the imitation sessions (IMI) participants were instructed to
watch the video clip and afterwards imitate the gesture performed by
the actor. We instructed participants to perform specular imitation
(execution of themovement as if looking at amirror), as it is considered
more natural than anatomical imitation according to developmental
studies, and it has been shown to lead to stronger engagement of the
MNS than anatomic imitation (Koski et al., 2003).
During the control task (CT) the participants were instructed to
watch the video clip and discriminate the colour of the circle depicted
on the actor's pullover (dark or light brown). Participants were asked
to indicate their decision, at the end of the video, by moving their arm
over their chest and tapping their contralateral shoulder. This move-
mentwas counterbalanced across the CT session according to the colour
of the circle: right arm for dark brown and left arm for light brown
circle. This procedure was used in order to control for the movements
during the imitation session and to equate formotor preparation during
both tasks.
The instruction for each task was presented once for 10 s at the
beginning of the session, and the sequence of sessions (IMI-CT-IMI-CT
or CT-IMI-CT-IMI) was counterbalanced across participants. Each of
the four experimental sessions lasted 14 min. One session consisted
of 45 trials with the following sequence: observation phase (O), at-
tention cue (green square), execution phase (E). The green square
was used to cue participants to prepare for performing the task (IMI
or CT). A temporal jitter (1–4 s) was inserted between video clip pre-
sentation and cue. A jitter of 6–8 s was also inserted after the execu-
tion phase (see Fig. 2). Order of video clip conditions in each session
and order of videos within each condition were pseudorandomised
and counterbalanced. Each video clip was presented three times and
always in the same condition (IMI or CT) in order to keep the condi-
tions independent.
The participants were instructed to perform the movements as
comfortably as possible. To minimise the amount of head movement,
each participant's head was stabilised with foam padding and upper
arms (shoulders) were partially strapped with Velcro bands in such
a way to still allow free movement of lower arms, hands, and ﬁngers.
Presentation of all stimuli was controlled by a computer using the
Presentation 11 software package (Neurobehavioural Systems, http://
www.neurobs.com). The stimuli were presented with MR-compatible
LCD goggles and a headset (VisuaStim XGA, Resonance Technology
Inc., Los Angeles, USA).Fig. 2. The sequence and duration of each event in one trial. Four sessions were performed: t
session, and 45 trials were performed in each session.All participants had two different training sessions immediately
before the scanning session. The ﬁrst training took place outside of the
scanner to clarify the task to the participant. In the second training, par-
ticipants practiced movements while lying in the MR scanner to help
them habituate themselves to executing movements in the scanner.
Both training sessions used video clips different to those used in the
actual experiment.
fMRI data acquisition
Images were collected with a 3T whole body scanner (Philips) with
echoplanar imaging (EPI) capability using a radio-frequency head coil
or sense coil. Multislice T2*-weighted echo-planar images were
obtained from a gradient-echo sequence with the following parame-
ters: TE = 30 ms, TR = 2000 ms, NS = 31, FA = 80°, FOV = 224,
ST = 3.5 mm, IG = 1 mm, in-plane resolution 3.5 × 3.5 mm, 31 axial
slices in a matrix of 64 × 64. In order to control for possible anatomical
malformations T1-weighted images 3D FFE sequence (TR = 25 ms;
TE = 4.59 ms; NS = 170 (sagittal); ST = 2 mm; IG = 1 mm; FOV
256 × 256; voxel size = 1 × 1 × 2 mm) were acquired for each
subject.
Image processing and data analysis
The entire data analysis was performed with SPM5 (Statistical
Parametric Mapping Software; The Welcome Trust Center for Neuro-
imaging, University College London, London, UK) run on MATLAB
(The Mathworks, Inc., Natick, MA). The ﬁrst four images of each run
were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration. For each participant,
all volumes were spatially realigned to the ﬁrst volume of the ﬁrst
session and unwarped to correct for between-scan motion. A mean
image from the realignment volumewas created. This image was spa-
tially normalised to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) EPI
brain template available in SPM5. The derived spatial transformation
was then applied to the realignment T2—2 × 2 × 2 mm3 voxels using
sinc interpolation in space. All functional volumes were then spatially
smoothed (FWHM 8).
Data were analysed using a random-effect model. Single subject
fMRI responses were modelled in a general linear model (GLM) by a
design matrix compromising the onsets of the observation phase
(O; video clip), the attention cue (green square) and the execution
phase (E) according to the experimental task and gesture category.
In order to control for movement artefacts, participants with more
than 3 mm translation and 4° rotation movements were excludedwo for each task (IMI and CT). Task instruction was displayed at the beginning of every
Table 2
Effects of interest—summary of contrasts.
Hypothesis Contrast
Task Mirror properties (MNS) for imitation task during both
experimental phases for all gesture categories
(posterior inferior frontal gyrus [pars opercularis]
and IPL [area PFt])
Conjunction (t-test)
[IMIO (S + NS + ML) > CTO (S + NS + ML)] ∩
[(IMIE (S + NS + ML) > CTE (S + NS + ML))]
Gesture content Mentalizing properties (MS) for social vs non-social gestures
during both experimental phases (O + E) and tasks (IMI + CT)
(cingulate, paracingulate cortex and STS/TPJ)
Main Effects (t-test)
[(S (IMIO + CTO + IMIE + CTE) > NS (IMIO + CTO + IMIE + CTE)]
Interaction of task and gesture content
(observation)
Mentalizing properties (MS) during observation phase (O)
for imitation of social vs non-social gestures
(cingulate, paracingulate cortex and STS/TPJ)
Interaction effect (t-test)
(S-IMIO > NS-IMIO) > (S-CTO > NS-CTO)
Interaction of task and gesture content
(observation and execution)
Mentalizing (MS) and mirror (MNS) properties in both
experimental phases (O + E) for imitation of social vs non-social
gestures - Interaction effect of task and gesture content
(IPL, IFG and pSTS)
Interaction effect (F-test)
[(S-IMIO > S-CTO) + (S-IMIE > S-CTE)] >
[(NS-IMIO > NS-CTO) + (NS-IMIE > NS-CTE)]
Interaction of task, gesture content and phase Self referential processes during imitation of social vs non-social
gestures—interaction effect of experimental phase (O > E),
task (IMI > CT) and gesture content (S > NS)
(mPF)
Interaction effect (F-test)
[(S-IMIO > NS-IMIO) > (S-CTO > NS-CTO)] >
[(S-IMIE > NS-IMIE) > (S-CTE > NS-CTE)]
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covariates of no interest for each participant. Twelve different simple
contrasts concerning task (IMI, CT) and gesture category (S, NS, ML)
of observation (O) and execution phase (E) were performed. For the
second level or group analysis, these corresponding contrast images
for task and gesture category of observation phase (O) and execution
phase (E) of the ﬁrst stage for each participant (S-IMIO, NS-IMIO,
ML-IMIO, S-IMIE, NS-IMIE, ML-IMIE, S-CTO, NS-CTO, ML-CTO, S-CTE,
NS-CTE, ML-CTE) were entered into a ﬂexible factorial ANOVA, in
which subjects were treated as random variables.
As we expected small effects for the mentalizing system, we de-
cided to employ the Monte-Carlo simulation of the whole brain vol-
ume to establish an appropriate voxel contiguity threshold (Slotnick
et al., 2003). This correction has the advantage of higher sensitivity
to smaller effect sizes, while still correcting for multiple comparisons
across the whole brain volume. Assuming an individual voxel type I
error of P b .01, a cluster extent of 90 contiguous resample voxels
was necessary to correct for multiple voxel comparisons at P b .05.
Additionally, we decided to consider only local maxima also signiﬁ-
cant at P b .0001.
The voxel coordinates of activation peaks are reported in MNI atlas
space using the SPM Anatomy toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005).
Effects of interest
To test the inﬂuence of task (IMI or CT) and gesture content (social
[S], non-social [NS] and meaningless [ML]) on activation in brain
regions implicated in the MNS andMS during observation (O) and ex-
ecution of gestures (E), we analysed the following effects (see Table 2
for the summary of contrasts):
1. Task effect. For the MNS the additional constraint was that “mirror
properties” of corresponding regions (IPL and the posterior part of
IFG) are present and reﬂected in common activations during ob-
servation and execution. To test this hypothesis we calculate a con-
junction between the main contrasts of imitation vs control task
during both experimental phases: [(IMIO (S + NS + ML) > CTO
(S + NS + ML)) ∩ (IMIE (S + NS + ML) > CTE (S + NS + ML))].
We hypothesised that the process of understanding the com-
municative intentions implied in others' actions (mentalizing
process) takes place preferentially during observation phase and
might be driven by the content (social [S] > non social [NS])
and task (observation in order to imitate (imitation [IMI] > pure
observation [CT])). To test this hypothesis we performed an inter-
action analysis of task and gesture during observation phase
[(S-IMIO > NS-IMIO) > (NS-CTO)].2. Gesture content effect. We hypothesised that the MS is speciﬁ-
cally involved in processing and production of social gesture.
To test this hypothesis we calculated the main effect of gesture
content across all conditions [S (IMIO + CTO + IMIE + CTE) > NS
(IMIO + CTO + IMIE + CTE)].
3. Interaction effect of task and gesture content.We tested the interaction
of task (IMI > CT) and gesture content (S > NS) to see if areas of
the MNS (IPL and posterior IFG) andMS (TPJ, pSTS and medial frontal
cortex) would be activated especially when gestures with commu-
nicative intention (S > NS) are imitated (IMI > CT) during both ex-
perimental phases: [(S-IMIO > S-CTO) + (S-IMIE > S-CTE)] > [(NS-
IMIO > NS-CTO) + (NS-IMIE > NS-CTE)].
4. Interaction effect of task, gesture content and experimental phase. We
hypothesised that activation in the medial frontal cortex for social
gestures is modulated by imitation due to self-referential processing.
In order to test this hypothesis, we tested interaction effects with
phase (O > E), task (IMI > CT) and gesture content (S > NS) as fac-
tors in order to test the inﬂuence of imitation and social gestures
during observation and execution: [(S-IMIO > NS-IMIO) > (S-CTO >
NS-CTO)] > [(S-IMIE > NS-IMIE) > (S-CTE > NS-CTE)].
Results
Task effect: imitation vs control task during observation and execution
phase [(IMIO > CTO) ∩ (IMIE > CTE)]
During both tasks the participants were observing (O) and exe-
cuting (E) gestures. For the IMI > CT (imitation neural network) in
both phases [(IMIO (S + NS + ML) > CTO (S + NS + ML)) ∩ (IMIE
(S + NS + ML) > CTE (S + NS + ML))] we found bilateral activa-
tion of the superior and inferior parietal lobule, including the supple-
mentary motor area (SMA) and sensorimotor cortex (SPL), as well as
the posterior aspect of the inferior frontal cortex (pars opercularis)
and superior temporal gyrus (extending to right STS) (Table 3; Fig.
3). We found no signiﬁcant activations for the reverse contrast
(CT > IMI).
Gesture content effect: social vs non social (S > NS)
We compared the gesture conditions (main effect) in order to inves-
tigate if thementalizing system is speciﬁcally involved in the processing
of social vs non-social gestures [S (IMIO + CTO + IMIE + CTE) > NS
(IMIO + CTO + IMIE + CTE)]. We found signiﬁcant activation in the
right middle cingulate (BA 24/32; 12, 32, 32; t = 3.54; 355 voxels),
the left medial orbitofrontal (BA 24/32/10; −10, 32, −10; t = 3.55;
319 voxels), and the right superior frontal cortices (BA 9/10; 24, 52,
Table 3
Imitation vs control task.
Local maxima Cluster size Left Right Percent overlap of clusters
with cytoarchitectonic areas
(IMIO > CTO) ∩ (IMIE > CTE) x y z T x y z T %
Supplementary motor
area (SMA)
595
449
−4 8 50 3.27 26 −2 54 5.05 Right area 6
Left area 6
29.6
43.7
Middle temporal gyrus 282
108
−48 −58 −2 3.6 50 −72 18 3.12 Right IPC 61.3
Superior parietal lobule 207 −24 −58 58 3.22 Left SPL (7 A)
Right SPL (5 M)
Left SPL (5 M)
Left area 4 a
Left SPL (7P)
70.0
10.8
7.1
4.1
2.9
Inferior parietal lobule 169
92
−34
−54
−38
−24
40
38
3.01
3.63
Left IPC
Left area 2
Left hIP2
Left hIP1
Left hIP 3
Left SPL (7PC)
Left IPC (PFt)
Left area 2
Left IPC (PF)
22.3
17.7
15.6
8.1
7.2
1.9
58.0
36.8
5.2
Superior temporal gyrus 140
129
−64 −50 19 3.53 48 −42 12 3.73 Left IPC 2.3
Precentral gyrus 126 54 6 28 3.6 Right area 44 43.8
Postcentral gyrus 123 36 −36 54 3.12 Right area 2
Right area 3 b
74.8
22.7
Middle cingulate cortex 111 −14 −28 40 3.50 Left SPL (5 Ci)
Left area 31
33.6
18.0
Middle temporal gyrus 111 38 −66 −4 2.97 Right hOC5 2.7
Pallidum 395 −18 2 0 3.77
Thalamus 303 8 −22 −2 3.14
Putamen 161 24 12 −4 3.01
Signiﬁcant cluster activations at P b .05 (Monte Carlo corrected). Coordinates are listed in MNI atlas space; SPM Anatomy tool box (Eickhoff et al., 2005). Abbreviations: SMA (Sup-
plementary Motor Area); V5/MT + (visual motor area 5); SPL (superior parietal lobule); IPL (inferior parietal lobule).
299A.G. Mainieri et al. / NeuroImage 81 (2013) 294–30512; t = 2.62; 230 voxels) for social in contrast to non-social gestures.
Contrast estimates (Fig. 4) indicate that activation in the rightmiddle cin-
gulate cortex (BA 24/32) is predominantly a response to social gestures
during observation phase (O) in both tasks (Fig. 4B). By contrast activa-
tion of the left medial orbitofrontal cortex (BA 24/32/10) seems to be re-
lated to social gestures only during imitation (S-IMIO > NS-IMIO; Fig. 4C).
Finally, signiﬁcant activation of the right superior frontal cortex (BA 9/10)
seems to be predominantly related to activations for social gestures
during the imitation task in both phases of the experiment (Fig. 4A).
We found no signiﬁcant clusters of activation for the reverse contrast
(all-NS > all-S).
Interaction effect of task (IMI vs CT) and gesture content (S vs NS)
For the interaction of task (IMIO > CTO) and gesture content
(SO > NSO) during observation phase (S-IMIO > NS-IMIO) > (S-CTO >
NS-CTO), we found activation in the postcentral gyrus and middle
cingulate cortex (Table 4). For the reverse contrast, we did not ﬁnd
any signiﬁcant activations.
To test for speciﬁc activation for social gestures during imitation in
contrast to the control task, we performed an interaction analysis includ-
ing task and gesture content as factors: [(S-IMIO > S-CTO) + (S-IMIE >
S-CTE)] > [(NS-IMIO > NS-CTO) + (NS-IMIE > NS-CTE)]. This analysis
revealed activation in the right inferior parietal lobule (area PFt) [local
maxima: 50,−34, 46; F = 12.67; 266 voxels]. Contrast estimates of the
activation in each condition (Fig. 5a and b) indicate that activation of
this region is speciﬁcally related to social gestures during imitation. In
order to assess whether this observation holds statistically, we subse-
quently performed post-hoc analyses. Contrasts with peak values at the
same peak of the interaction are indicated on the bar graph of contrast
estimates, along with t-values (Fig. 5a: S-IMIO > NS-IMIO (t = 2.96),
S-IMIE > NS-IMIE (t = 2.71); Fig. 5b: S-IMI > S-CT (t = 5.20),
NS-IMI > NS-CT (t = 3.48)).Interaction effect of task (IMI vs CT), gesture content (S vs NS) and
phase (O vs E)
Finally, to investigate the differences in self-referential processes
between action observation (O) in contrast to execution (E) of social
gestures, we performed an interaction analysis of gesture content
(S > NS), task (IMI > CT) and experimental phase (O > E): [(S-IMIO >
NS-IMIO) > (S-CTO > NS-CTO)] > [(S-IMIE > NS-IMIE) > (S-CTE > NS-
CTE)]. This analysis revealed activation in themedial orbital gyrus. Con-
trast estimates indicate a context dependent activation of the medial
orbitofrontal cortex (12, 40,−4; F = 12.81; 205 voxels) during obser-
vation and execution of social gesture (see Fig. 6). In order to assess
whether this impression also holds statistically, we subsequently
performed a post-hoc analyses. Contrasts with peak values on the
same peak of the interaction are indicated on the bar graph of contrast
estimates, along with t-values [Fig. 6 bar graph: S-IMIO > NS-IMIO
(T = 2.63), S-IMIO > S-IMIE (t = 2.41), S-CTE > NS-CTE (t = 3.56)].
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to investigate the neural corre-
lates of communicative gestures related to abstract mental states dur-
ing observation and execution. The novel aspect of the study is its
investigation of communicative gestures that represent the abstract
mental states of both sender and receiver (communicative intention)
via imitation (social behaviour). We investigated if parts of the MS
and MNS are both relevant for the observation and production of
communicative gestures. We demonstrated that activation of the
MNS can be modulated by task (imitation vs control), gesture content
(social vs non social) and by an interaction between task (imitation vs
control) and gesture content (social vs non social) with activation in
the right IPL, suggesting that activity in this area is enhanced by social
gestures due to the presence of communicative intention inbuilt in
Fig. 3. The signiﬁcant activations for imitation task [(IMIO > CTO) ∩ (IMIE > CTE)]. For illustration, bar graphs display the contrast estimates of gesture content (S: social gesture,
NS: non-social gestures, ML: meaningless gestures) and task (IMI: imitation task, CT: control task) during observation (O) and execution phases (E). These regions were selected
due to our hypothesis but the same effects are present in all other clusters. Signiﬁcant cluster activations at P b .05 (Monte Carlo correction). Voxel coordinates are in MNI atlas
space; SPM Anatomy tool box (Eickhoff et al., 2005).
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more engaged during observation of social than non social gestures
suggesting that this area, as part of the MS, contributes to the process-
ing of communicative intentions in social gestures (Amodio and Frith,
2006; Ciaramidaro et al., 2007; Gallagher et al., 2000; Hooker et al.,
2008).
However, our ﬁndings go beyond this in showing an interaction
effect between task (imitation vs control), stimulus content (social
vs non social) and experimental phase (observation vs execution)
with activation in the mOFC. In accordance with our hypotheses and
given the evidence that different cortical midline structures are impli-
cated in self-referential processes (Northoff et al., 2006), activity in
mOFC may thus indicate that self-referential processes are also rele-
vant for the representation of communicative gestures, which mirror
self and other abstract mental states.
Imitation: do the MNS and MS contribute to the computation of
communicative gestures during imitation?
In general, the pattern of activation for imitation in contrast to the
control task [(IMIO > CTO) ∩ (IMIE > CTE)] in our study is consistent
with ﬁndings on enacted or mental imitation, including the inferior
frontal gyrus (BA 6/44), premotor cortex (BA 6), superior (BA 7) and in-
ferior parietal lobule (PFt area) (Baumgaertner et al., 2007; Caspers et
al., 2010; Clark et al., 2004; Hermsdorfer et al., 2001; Iacoboni et al.,
1999; Lewis, 2006; Muhlau et al., 2005; Tanaka et al., 2001).In addition to the neural network related to imitation we also found
activation in themiddle posterior cingulate cortex and pSTSduring both
observation and execution. The posterior cingulate cortex has been
found to be implicated in thinking about one's intentions and conse-
quent actions (sustaining intention to perform an action in the near
future) (den Ouden et al., 2005) and in self-referential representation
(Lombardo et al., 2010). Likewise, the right pSTS has been found to be
activated during false belief (TOM) and attention tasks (Mitchell,
2008). Taken together, our data indicate that in addition to imitation
neural network, areas previously found in relation to processing of in-
tentions, self-reference and attention are also activated during imitation
when both observing and when executing.
Mentalizing might occur preferentially in the ﬁrst stages of imita-
tion, that is, during action observation. Thus, we explored the neural
correlates of task (IMI > CT) and gesture content (S > NS) during
the observation phase. Our results suggest that regions of the MNS
(IPL) and cortical midline structures might be modulated by how sa-
lient the intentionality (communicative intention) is embedded in
the social gestures during observation with the intention to imitate.
We found an interaction effect in the postcentral gyrus (area PFt)
and middle posterior cingulate cortex for imitation of social gestures
during observation phase (Table 4). The PFt area is the main area in-
volved in imitation (Caspers et al., 2010) and the posterior middle
cingulate cortex has been found to be involved in the process of
self-awareness and self-related processing (den Ouden et al., 2005;
Lombardo et al., 2010; Marsh and Hamilton, 2011; Ruby and Decety,
Fig. 4. Signiﬁcant activations for social gestures [S (IMIO + CTO + IMIE + CTE) > NS (IMIO + CTO + IMIE + CTE)]. Signiﬁcant cluster activations at P b .05 (Monte Carlo correc-
tion). For illustration, bar graphs display the contrast estimates of gesture content and task during observation and execution phases. Voxel coordinates are in MNI atlas space;
SPM Anatomy tool box (Eickhoff et al., 2005). Local maxima: (a) superior frontal gyrus: 24, 52, 12 (t = 2.62; 230 voxels); (b) middle cingulate gyrus: 12, 32, 32 (t = 3.54; 355
voxels); (c) orbitofrontal: −10, 32, −10 (t = 3.55; 319 voxels).
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non-social gestures for the imitation task in the right inferior parietal
cortex (PFt area) during both observation and execution phases (see
Fig. 5, bar graph B). The analysis indicates that the activation in the
PFt area is statistically signiﬁcant only between social compared to
non-social gestures during imitation task contrasts (see Fig. 5, bar
graph A), suggesting that the communicative intention embedded inTable 4
Interaction of gesture (SO > NSO) and task (IMIO > CTO)—observation phase.
Local maxima cluster size Left
(S-IMIO > NS-IMIO) >
(S-CTO > NS-CTO)
x y z
Postcentral gyrus 205
Posterior middle cingulate cortex 128 −8 −36 46
Signiﬁcant cluster activations at P b .05 (Monte Carlo correction). Coordinates are listed in
ferior parietal lobule), hIP (human anterior intraparietal sulcus) and SPL (superior parietalthe social gestures was more salient during both phases (O and E) of
the imitation in contrast to the control task. This effect indicates that
this region might be driven by the communicative intentions during
the imitative process. It seems that the neural correlates underlying im-
itation of social gesturesmight be modulated by the communicative in-
tention implied in the action observed. Liew et al. (2011) showed
similar results investigating familiar versus unfamiliar gestures duringRight Percent overlap of clusters
with cytoarchitectonic areas
T x y z T %
50 −32 50 3.22 Right area 2
Right IPC (PFt)
10.6
12.0
3.73 SPL (5 M)
SPL (5CI)
13.8
10.6
MNI atlas space; SPM Anatomy tool box (Eickhoff et al., 2005). Abbreviations: IPL (in-
lobule).
Fig. 5. Interaction of task [imitation (IMI) vs control task (CT)] and gesture content [social (S) and non-social (NS)]. Inferior Parietal Cortex (IPC); local maxima: 50,−34, 46 (F = 12.67;
266 voxels). (a) For illustration, bar graphs display the contrast estimates of gesture content (S: social gesture, NS: non-social gestures) and task (IMI: imitation task, CT: control) during
observation (O) and execution phases (E). (b) For illustration, bar graphs display the contrast estimates of gesture content (S: social gesture, NS: non-social gestures) according to task
(IMI: imitation task, CT: control) during both observation and execution phase (O + E). All post-hoc tests of the interaction are whole brain t-tests at every voxel; the required post-hoc-
and the t-statistics presented have been adjusted for multiple comparisons on top of cluster thresholding for the number of voxels used for the whole-brain analyses. The regions shown
in the ﬁgure are the overlap between the whole brain post-hoc- and the interaction results. * indicates P b .05, corrected for multiple comparisons.
302 A.G. Mainieri et al. / NeuroImage 81 (2013) 294–305passive observation. Here the participants were requested to make ac-
tive inferences about the actor's intention while watching short video
clips. Both familiar and unfamiliar gestures activated neural areasFig. 6. Interaction of observation and execution of intended actions in imitation vs control task
For illustration, bar graphs display the contrast estimates of gesture content and task during
(F = 12.81; 205 voxels). Signiﬁcant cluster activation at P b .05 (Monte Carlo correction). Vo
post-hoc tests of the interactionwerewhole brain t-tests at every voxel; the required post-hoc-
thresholding for the number of voxels used for the whole-brain analyses. The region shown in t
dicates P b .05 corrected for multiple comparisons.related to MS and MNS. The authors suggested that the unique social
demands of inferring intentions modulate neural activity in MNS (IPL)
and MS (posterior cingulate cortex) regions differently during passive[(S-IMIO > NS-IMIO) > (S-CTO > NS-CTO)] > [(S-IMIE > NS-IMIE) > (S-CTE > NS-CTE)].
observation and execution. Local maxima: medial orbitofrontal gyrus (OFC) 12, 40, −4
xel coordinates are in MNI atlas space; SPM Anatomy toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005). All
and the t-statistics presented have been adjusted formultiple comparisons on top of cluster
he ﬁgure is the overlap between the whole brain post-hoc and the interaction results. * in-
303A.G. Mainieri et al. / NeuroImage 81 (2013) 294–305observation. Both results, ours and those from Liew et al. (2011), reveal
a complex interplay between one's perceptual and motor experiences
and the other's action observed. Moreover, these results indicate that
task instruction might play a central role in modulating MNS and MS
during action observation.
Overall, our data suggest that the right IPL and IFG contribute in dif-
ferent ways to processing communicative intentions of gestures during
imitation, depending on the phase: observation or execution. Moreover,
activation in the middle posterior cingulate cortex during observation of
social gestures with intention to imitate seems to be driven by the ab-
stract mental states underlying social gestures (self/other processing).
However, the IPL is a multi-modal region commonly associated with
grasp affordances, motor attention, body awareness and action planning
(Fogassi and Luppino, 2005; Oztop and Arbib, 2002). Likewise, posterior
cingulate cortex and IFG are also involved in autobiographical memory,
emotion recognition and emotion regulation (Pfeifer and Peake, 2012;
Viard et al., 2011). Therefore, additional research might help us to eluci-
datewhether these results are due to strategies employed to understand
the observed actor's gesture in order to imitate [e.g. trying to simulate
the gesture vs trying to objectively reasoning about the gesture itself]
or the affective component (emotionality) present in our social gestures.
Mentalizing: is the MS active during observation and execution of
social gestures?
In linewith our hypotheses the results indicate that themedial fron-
tal cortex, as part of the MS, is involved in the processing/production of
social communicative gestures. We investigated the effects for social in
contrast with non-social gestures in all conditions, andwe found activa-
tions in the cingulate gyrus (BA 32/24), orbitofrontal cortex (BA 24/32/
10) and superior frontal cortex (BA 9/10). Taking into account the con-
trast estimates (see Fig. 4 bar graphs), the areas of themedial frontal cor-
texwere predominantly activatedwhile theparticipantswere observing
social gestures in order to imitate (IMIO). As we expected, areas related
to mentalizing processes (mPFC) were preferentially activated during
observation of social gestures (communicative intention). Our data
is also consistent with ﬁndings from studies about self and other
(Vogeley et al., 2001), perspective taking (Schilbach et al., 2007), infer-
ring deceit in the actions of others (Grezes et al., 2004), social game
tasks (Kircher et al., 2009a), body orientation on the neural processing
of speech accompanied by gestures (Straube et al., 2010), and face and
word processing (Kircher et al., 2000). The mPFC is also more activated
during observation than execution of social gestures, indicating that MS
is more involved in observation of social gestures than in their execu-
tion, as we hypothesised and also in line with Schippers et al. (2009).
In the present study social gestures are actions that represent
mental states with the following characteristics: (a) the signals are
sent (by the sender) with the intention of altering the receiver's mental
state and (b) the receiver (observer) attributes mental states to the
sender (Frith, 2007; Walter et al., 2004). Thus, we assumed that
recognising the communicative intention of another person (sender)
toward oneself (receiver) would trigger the mentalizing mechanism,
because the other's intention is built into the action (sender's intention
to alter the mental state of the receiver) and, at the same time, one's
ownmental states (receiver's alteredmental state according to sender's
intentions). Thus, the activations in themFC and right IPL (Fig. 5) for so-
cial gestures during imitation might indicate that parts of the MNS and
MS aremore engaged during imitation of gestures with communicative
intention in a socially relevant context (imitation). In this sense the
MNS and MS both seem to contribute to the understanding of commu-
nicative gestures with communicative intentions.
Does imitation of social gestures require self referential processes?
For imitation of social gestures we found activation only in the me-
dial orbitofrontal cortex (extending to the cingulate and paracingulateareas) (Fig. 6), suggesting that this area has different roles during obser-
vation and execution of intended actions according to phase, task and
intention-content of the gesture. The mOFC was signiﬁcantly more ac-
tive for social gestures during observing than executing (see Fig. 6, bar
graph). The mOFC was also signiﬁcantly more active for social than
non-social gestures during execution phase (see Fig. 6, bar graph).
These results suggest that the communicative intention embedded in
the social gestures was more salient during the imitation condition
(social task/imitative behaviour) than during the control condition
(non-social task/colour discrimination).
One possible interpretation might be that social gestures include
content and contexts that can be experienced as strongly related to
one's self, especially if imitation is required, suggesting that the activa-
tion of the mOFC might be due to self-referential processing (Kircher
et al., 2000; Northoff et al., 2006). According to the simulation theory
ofmind reading, the observer tries tomimic or to convert one'smental
state into the other person's, leading to shared mental states between
observer and the observed. This requires self-referential processing
once the other's person mental state resonates with the observer's
mental state (Schippers et al., 2010). Therefore, to imitate social ges-
tures, it is necessary to distinguish between self and other mental
states during the observation phase, while during the execution
phase it is just the execution of a motor plan. Previous investigators
have suggested that the ventromedial or orbitofrontal cortex lesions
are associated with mind reading deﬁcits (Stuss et al., 2001) and, pa-
tients with bilateral orbitofrontal cortex lesions were impaired in
tasks that requiredmore subtle social reasoning (i.e., detecting a social
faux pas) but not in typical false-belief theory of mind tasks (Stone et
al., 1998). Moreover, in three different studies on the mentalizing sys-
tem, similar local activation in the medial frontal cortex was found
[observing of animated shapes (Martin and Weisberg, 2003); choos-
ing an ending of a cartoon story (Walter et al., 2004); false communi-
cative intention (irony) with cartoons (Wakusawa et al., 2007)],
suggesting that the mOFC takes part in the process of mentalizing,
even if it is rarely found in traditional mentalizing tasks.
An alternative explanation for the activation of mOFC in our study
could be related to the affective component (emotionality) present in
our social gestures. Further studies are necessary to disentangle the emo-
tional aspect. The role of the mOFC is manifold. Anatomically both the
mOFC and vmPFC receive connections from all regions associated with
primary and/or secondary exteroceptive sensory modalities (olfactory,
gustatory, somatosensory, auditory, visual) (Kringelbach and Rolls,
2004), suggesting that these areasmight have implications in a number
of mental processes.
Limitations and future directions
Altogether, there is a possibility that the process of social in com-
parison to meaningless gestures might be driven by semantic aspects
(Supplementary material: Tables S5, S6, S7 and S8). Due to methodo-
logical constraints (length of the sessions) we did not include a con-
trol task for semantic processes. Future studies applying a similar
paradigm and controlling for semantic processes could provide addi-
tional insights into the differences betweenmeaningful andmeaning-
less gestures in the context of gesture communication.
Conclusion
In a nutshell, our study suggests that processing of social inten-
tions mediated by communicative gestures require both MS and
MNS. Our data support the assumption that the MNS and MS both
contribute to the process of gestures with communicative intention.
At a neural level, both the MNS and MS act in concert during imita-
tion of social gestures. More speciﬁcally, we found increased activa-
tion in the IPL and mPF for gestures with communicative intentions
and related to abstract mental states. Performing an action during a
304 A.G. Mainieri et al. / NeuroImage 81 (2013) 294–305social interaction not only requires the presence of intentions or
states of mind in the action per se (content or goal), but also that
the communicative intention would be recognised by the receiver
(Frith, 2007; Walter et al., 2004). In this way gestures are social
tools. The interaction analysis of gesture content and imitation task
indicates that the right inferior parietal lobule might be recruited
to distinguish gestures with communicative social intentions from
general actions during social context. Moreover, the medial frontal
brain regions are important for the differentiation of observation
and execution processes in the context of social and non-social ges-
ture processing. The representation of communicative intentions
might require a capacity mediated by the mFC related to the MS, al-
though other networks, such as the MNS, might have an additional
role in extracting the motoric meaning. However, our ﬁndings go
beyond this in showing an interaction effect between task, stimuli
and experimental phase (observation and execution), in the mOFC,
suggesting possible self-referential processes for the representation
of communicative social intention with the discrimination of self
and other mental states.
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